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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
two distinct state statutes, differently worded and construed, can be thought
of as the same cause of action.
It is submitted that although the instant case reaches the proper
result, it is but the product of a group of cases which have drawn many
fine and sometimes inaccurate distinctions between res judicata and cstoppel
by judgment. The confusion resulting might be avoided by emphasis in
court decisions on the basic premise that res judicata bars another action
while estoppel by judgment precludes relitigation of facts.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - USE OF TAXING POWER BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN CONFLICT WITH
STATES' POLICE POWERS
Plaintiff filed an information against the defendant for failing to register
and pay the "gamblers occupational tax".' Held, the act is unconstitutional
because the requirements of registration usurped the police powers of the
states. United States v. Kahriger, 105 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
There can be no doubt about the federal government's extensive power
to tax. Equally certain is it that the police powers are exclusive with the
states. Doubts, if any, exist only where Congress, through taxation legisla-
tion, intentionally or unintentionally infringes upon the police powers re-
served to the states.
Several times, from the early 19th century to date, the Supreme Court
of the United States has reiterated the principle that the federal government
cannot accomplish by means of the taxing power that which it otherwise
cannot do.2 More often, however, it has chosen to rely on the principle that
if Congress has passed a revenue measure, the Court will not look to the
motives behind the passing of the tax legislation.3  In a fairly recent case
involving the "Marijuana Tax" the following language appears: "It is be-
yond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. Nor
does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Con-
gress might not otherwise regulate."4
To support its view, the court in the instant case relied on United States
v. Constantine.5 Quoting at length from the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts,
the court concludes that it is immaterial that the tax, by itself, could be a valid
one. With apparent misgivings and with consideration given to present
1. 65 STAT. 529, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3290, 3291 (1951).
2. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
3. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); Nigro v. United States,
276 U.S. 332 (1928); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919); McCray v. United
States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
4. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).
5. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
CASES NOTED
social conditions, the judge reasons that the taxing aspects of the statute are
not separable from the regulatory police power aspects. Since the regulatory
requirements were deemed unconstitutional because they infringed upon the
state's police powers, the whole statute must be voided. The court admits
that federal courts generally do not inquire into the motives of Congress in
passing tax legislation. By differentiating between taxation and regulation
the court circumvents this rule.
It is interesting to note that the statute involved has been involved in
four district court decisions. Although the first two cases did not present
the same issue,6 one of them has already been affirmed by the Supreme
Court.7 The other two district court decisions,8 decided upon the very same
issue, have upheld the validity of the statute.
It is submitted that the Constantine case,9 which seemed to the judge in
the instant case to ". . . reveal the silver thread of truth. . ."0 and which
involved a similar tax statute, can be distinguished. That case involved a
tax on unlawful conduct of retail liquor businesses and in effect imposed a
federal penalty upon a state penalty. The statute in the instant case pur-
posely avoids this pitfall of draftsmanship by requiring the registration and
taxation of all persons engaged in wagering, regardless of legality tinder
state laws.
Viewed in the light of present social conditions and the past decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States,'' it seems almost certain that
the instant case will be reversed on appeal. Present Supreme Court deci-
sions strongly indicate the federal tax power is practically unlimited.
COURTS - CONSTRUCTIVE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
In contempt proceedings brought by the United States against re-
spondent, the district court found defendant guilty of criminal contempt
for disobeying and resisting an order of a federal court' which demanded
his surrender. Dedendant appealed, pleading that there was no order
actually issued at the time of the alleged contempt and that he had no
6. United States v. Forrester, 105 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ca. 1952) (safeguards against
self-incrimination not infringed upon); Combs v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 531 (D.C. 1951)
(action to restrain enforcement denied on ground that petitioner had unclean hands).
7. Combs v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 531 (D.C. 1951), aff'd, 342 U.S. 939 (1952).
8. United States v. Smith, 106 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United States v. Nadler,
105 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
9. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
10. 105 F. Supp. 322, 323 (1952).
11. Supra, note 3.
12. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). "A Court of the United States shall have power to punish
by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, as . . . disobedi-
ence or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command."
